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HABAs CoaRpus-RIGHT OF Ar- U. S. 219 (1914); Belch v. ManPEA.-[Ilinois]- Relator was ar- ning, 55 Fla. 229, 46 So. 91 (1908);
rested on a warrant issued by the People v. Windes, 283 Ill. 251, 119
Governor of Illinois for his rendi- N. E. 297 (1918); People v. Kuhne,
tion on the requisition of the Gov- 107 N. Y. 1020 (1907).
ernor of Wisconsin, in which state
The weight of authority seems to
he was wanted for arson. On a be to the effect that, in the absence
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, of statutory provision, no order or
relator merely testified that he was judgment in habeas corpus pronot in Wisconsin on the day when ceedings is reviewable on appeal
the crime was allegedly committed. or writ of error. People v. Siman,
Though two witnesses testified to 284 Ill. 28, 119 N. E. 940 (1918);
the contrary, the trial court dis- In re Webers, 275 Mo. 677, 205 S.
charged the relator. On appeal, W. 620 (1918); Ex parte Logan, 33
reversed. Held: The trial court OkL. 659, 126 Pac. 800 (1912); Rex
cannot discharge one arrested un- v. Buxton, 2 K. B. 1056 (1910).
der a governor's warrant where The decisions are based either on
the evidence relating to the sub- the ground that the order or judgject of presence in or absence from ment in a habeas corpus proceedthe state is contradictory, inasmuch ing does not possess the finality or
as habeas corpus is not a proper other attributes necessary to bring
proceeding in which to try the it within the scope of the statutes
question of alibi or the guilt or permitting appeals or writs of erinnocence of the accused. People ror, or upon the more substantive
ex rel. Sedlack v. Toman, Sheriff, ground that the delay incident to
362 Ill. 516, 200 N. E. 331 (1936).
appeals would tend to defeat the
Strictly speaking, the writ of purpose of habeas corpus-a speedy
habeas corpus is not an action or remedy to the person unlawfully
a suit, but rather a summary rem- imprisoned. See State v. Towery,
edy open to the person detained. 143 Ala. 48, 39 So. 309 (1904); In
Orr v. Jackson, 149 Iowa 641, 128 re Hughes, 159 Cal. 360, 113 Pac.
N. W. 958 (1910); Arnold v. 684 (1911); Martin v. District
Schmidt, 155 Wis. 55, 143 N. W. Court, 37 Colo. 110, 86 Pac. 82
1055 (1913). Its great object is (1906); In re Williams, 149 N. C.
the speedy liberation of those who 436, 63 S. E. 108 (1908). Where
may be imprisoned without suffi- the order has refused the release
cient cause. Henry v. Henkel, 235 of the prisoner, the ground for not

[277]
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allowing an appeal on the part of
the petitioner is the fact that the
order is not final and he may seek
his release again, with the earlier
order not standing as a bar. Only
a few jurisdictions permit review
without express statutory authorization, and apparently limit its
availability only to the state. Gillard v. Clark, 105 Neb. 84, 179 N.
W. 396 (1920); People v. Kaiser,
206 N. Y. 46, 99 N. E. 195 (1912);
Garftnkle v. Sullivan, 37 Wash.
650, 80 Pac. 188 (1905); Harkrader
v. Wadley, 172 U. S. 148 (1898).
Statutory provisions have been
made in some jurisdictions providing for an appeal on habeas corpus,
though not all of them give such a
right when the petitioner is discharged. There is a conflict of authority as to whether appeals may
be taken from a discharge in habeas corpus cases under a general
statute relating to appeals, or
whether such cases must be specifically mentioned. The tendency
has been to deny the privilege except when specifically granted.
State v. Berkstresser, 137 Ala. 109,
34 So. 686 (1902); Notesten v.
Rogers, 18 N. M. 462, 138 Pac. 207
(1914); Wesiner v. Burrell, 28 Okla.
546, 118 Pac. 999 (1911).
The present case, of course,
arose in connection with interstate extradition, which is wholly
governed by constitution and statutory provisions. Courts have held
that on a hearing on a writ of habeas corpus in such a case, they
may consider only the following:
whether the prisoner falls under
the conditions of the federal statute; whether he is the person
charged; whether the papers are
sufficient under the law to justify a
warrant of extradition. People v.
Hyatt, 172 N. Y. 176, 64 N. E. 825
(1902); 'Work v. Corrington, 34
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Ohio St. 64 (1877); Ex parte Massee, 95 S. C. 315, 79 S. E. 97 (1913).
The judicial inquiry, however, cannot extend to the motive of the extradition proceedings. Barranger
v. Baum, 103 Ga. 465, 30 S. E. 524
(1898). Likewise, the court will
not go into the merits of the case
or determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. Drew v.
Thaw, 235 U. S. 432 (1914); State
v. Justus, 84 Minn. 237, 87 N. W.
770 (1901); Commonwealth v.
Philadelphia County Prison, 220
Pa. St. 401, 69 AtL 916 (1908).
Finally, courts, as in the instant
case, say that a person should not
be discharged where there is
merely contradictory evidence on
the subject of his presence in or
absence from the state. Munsey
v. Clough, 196 U. S. 364 (1905);
Dennison v. Christian, 72 Neb.
703, 101 N. W. 1045 (1904).
It would thus seem that, considering the nature of extradition
proceedings, perhaps the instant
court was correct in reversing the
order of discharge. But, however
desirable such a result is, the court
clearly disregarded the prevailing
view as to the writ of habeas corpus. The cases cited in the opinion are all cases where the appeal
was taken by the petitioner from
an order refusing discharge. People ex rel. v. Meyering, 349 Ill. 198,
181 N. E. 620 (1932); People ex rel.
v. Traeger, 340 Ill. 147, 172 N. E.
168 (1930); People ex rel. v. Meyering, 345 Ill. 449, 178 N. E. 80
(1931). The court disregarded the
case of People v. Siman, supra.
There Wr. Justice Duncan said:
"It is now the well settled doctrine
of this court [Illinois] that no writ
of error lies to review the order or
judgment of a court or judge in a
habeas corpus proceeding, for the
discharge of a prisoner in a crim-
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inal case, as the order or judgment
is not a final order or judgment.No appeal from such an order has
been granted by any statute in this
State, and consequently no appeal
is permissible from such an order
or judgment."
The better reasoning seems to be
that a writ of error or appeal will
not lie in behalf of the state to review an order or judgment of a
court of competent jurisdiction, in
habeas corpus proceedings discharging from custody the petitioner. Keeping in mind the original purpose of the writ, it is indeed difficult to perceive the wisdom or reason upon which statutes
and decisions are based which allow an appeal in such cases. The
delay which might, and generally
would, attend the appeal in many
cases would work a denial of the
very object of the writ, which is to
secure the present discharge of the
prisoner, and in most cases its
value would be so impaired as to
lose that distinctive character and
office with which it has always
been clothed.
Lr E. PImEc.
CoMMENT ON FAILuR To TESTIFY
-CoNsTrTUTIoNAI=Y

so PnovDmo -

OF

STATUTE

[South Dakota]

During a trial, in accordance with
a South Dakota statute (Laws 1927,
c. 93), expressly providing that in
a criminal case "defendant's failure to testify in his own behalf is
hereby declared to be a proper
subject of comment by the prosecuting attorney," the prosecutor
commented on the defendant's failure to testify. The defendant wa1
convicted.
On appeal, reversed.
Held: Statute is unconstitutional as
it violates section 9 of Article 6 of
the South Dakota constitution

279 which provides that "no person
shall be compelled in any criminal
case to give evidence against himself." State v. Wolfe, 266 N. W.
116 (S.D. 1936).
The Fifth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution
provides
against self-incrimination and all
the states have similar constitutional provisions except New Jersey and Iowa, which, nevertheless
grant this privilege by virtue of
the common law. State v. Zdanowiscz, 69 N. J. L. 619, 53 AtL 1047
(1903); State v. Height, 117 Iowa
650, 91 N. W. 935 (1902). Until
recent times, under the common
law, the accused was not permitted
to testify. In 1864 Maine passed
the first competency act "the person so charged shall at his own request but not otherwise be deemed
a competent witness," ME.

STAT.

(1864) c. 280. Maine was followed
by all the states save Georgia. GA.
AN. CODE (Park 1914) §1037. Almost all these statutes, while qualifying the defendant to testify, provide that failure to testify shall not
create a presumption against the
defendant, and this provision is
construed to forbid comment.
Commonwealth v. Scott, 123 Mass.
239 (1877); State v. Garrington,11
S. D. 178, 76 N. W. 326 (1877); cf.
State v. Monohan, 96 Conn. 289,
114 Atl. 102 (1921) (Statute expressly forbids comment).
Even in the absence of a statute
providing against comment or the
raising of a presumption, Virginia,
South Carolina and Georgia deny
such comment on the grounds that
it violates the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and
deprives accused of the presumption of innocence to which he is
entitled. Price v. Commonwealth,
77 Va. 393 (1883); State v. Howard,
35 S. C. 197 (1891); Coleman v.

280
State, 93 S. E. 154, 15 Ga. A. 338
(1914)". The United States Supreme Court, however, has decided that there is nothing in the
Federal Constitution to prevent the
states from permitting comment on
a failure to testify. See Twining v.
New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908).
Very few states permit comment
on a failure to testify. Parker v.
State, 61 N. J. L. 308, 39 A. 651
(1898); Patterson v. State, 122
Ohio 96, 171 N. E. 26 (1930); State
v. Stennett, 260 N. W. 732 (Iowa,
1935); State v. Cleaves, 59 Me. 298
(1871). It must be remembered,
however, that New Jersey and
Iowa have no constitutional provision against self-incrimination,
nor any statute forbidding comment. (IowA CODE (1927) §13891
repealed at 43rd Gen. Ass. c. 269.)
Ohio by constitutional amendment
provides for comment on failure to
testify. OHtO CONST. Art. I,, §10.
Four years later, however, the
Ohio court felt obliged to say that
the aforesaid amendment was not
intended to aid the prosecution or
to lessen the proof required on behalf of the prosecution.
See
Parker v. Village of Dover, 98
Ohio N. P. (N. s.) 465, 472 (1916).
Maine, in State v. Cleaves, supra,
held that there may be comment on
the defendant's silence; however,
the legislature later enacted that
the defendant on cross-examination should not be compelled to
testify to facts that would tend to
convict him of any crime, other
than that for which he was on trial.
Act of Feb. 14, 1879, c. 92, p. 112.
South Dakota is the only state
with the normal constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination
which has attempted by statute to
permit comment. In decisions prior
to the statute of 1927 the court
ruled that comment by the prose-
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cutor was reversible error. State
v. Garrington, 11 S. D. 178, 76 N.
W. 326 (1898); State v. Sonnenschein, 373 S. D. 585, 159 N. W.
101 (1916); State v. Lindec, 51 S.
D. 516, 215 N. W. 495 (1927).
The function of the constitutional provision against self-incrimination, so far as the individual
is concerned, is to guarantee to the
accused that he will not be forced
by positive present act or word to
furnish, produce, or make evidence
to be used against himself. See
Dills, Comment on Failure to Testify (1928) 3 Wash. L. Rev. 161,
164. The ultimate ground of policy
as regards the state is to prevent
the prosecution from relying for
proof of its case upon evidence obtained from the accused. See 4
Wigmore, EvmENc. (2nd ed. 1923)
§2272.
The reasoning of the majority of
the court in the instant case is that
the effect of the statute permitting
comment is to deprive the defendant of the option of testifying. If
he does take the stand he is subjected to gruelling cross-examination which detracts largely from
the weight of his testimony as evidence. See State v. Garrington,
supra at 188. If he exercises his
supposed privilege of not testifying, the prosecution draws an inference of guilt from his silence,
which inference, at least to the extent of the weight given to it by
the jury, is an incrimination of
himself by the accused. See People v. Tyler, 36 Cal. 523, 530 (1869).
To choose between two evils is
certainly not the true option intended by the constitutional provision.
The minority, however, points
out, as the late Judge Andrew
Bruce observed, that the constitutional provision against self-in-
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crimination was aimed only against
direct compulsion, and does not go
to the extent of prohibiting comment. See Bruce, The Right to
Comment on the Failureof the Defendant to Testify, 31 Mich. L. Rev.
226, 233 (1932), which isa reply to
Reeder, Comment on Failure of
Accused to Testify, 31 Mich. L.
Rev. 40 (1932) (two excellent discussions of this problem). Secondly, the minority contends that
nothing the prosecution can say
will either add or detract very
much from the impression the jury
already has of the defendant's failure to take the stand on his own
behalf. The jury's reaction "is
natural and irresistible. It will be
drawn by honest jurymen and no
instruction will prevent it." Parker
v. State, 61 N. J. L. 308, 39 AtL 651
(1898).
Thirdly, as a matter of
serving the best ends of justice, a
jury should be permitted to consider as one evidentiary fact in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused his failure
to testify-the probative effect of
which will vary according to varying circumstances in different
trials. This does not appear to be
unfair to the accused. "If innocent, he has every inducement to
state the facts, which would exonerate him. The truth would be his
protection. There can be no reason why he should withhold it, and
every reason for its utterance. Being guilty, . . . a statement of the
truth would lead to his conviction,
and justice would ensue." State
v. Cleaves, 59 Me. 298 (1871).
The logic of the dissent appears
to undermine the position of the
majority, and in the light of adoption of resolutions by both the
American Law Institute (9 Proc.
Am. L. Inst. 202-218 (1931) and
the American Bar Association (56
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A. B. A. Rep. 137-152 (1931) recommending that comment be permitted on the failure of the accused to testify, the majority holding seems questionable and retrogressive.
GERTRUD SIn.R.
UsE oF SvMoL "CAN/oR" IN INDICTMENT

As REVERSIBLE

ERROR.-

[Texas] Accused was found guilty
under an indictment charging him
with keeping a place to bet and
wager and to "gamble cards, dice
and/or dominoes" and as a place
where people resorted to "gamble,
bet and wager on games played
with cards, dice and/or dominoes."
On appeal, reversed. Held: Indictment quashable for use of symbol "and/or" and for omission of
the word "with" before the words
"cards, dice and/or dominoes."
Compton v. State, 91 S. W. (2d)
732 (Tex. Cr. App. 1936).
The objection to the indictment
having been properly raised by a
motion to quash, Cohn v. United
States, 258 Fed. 355 (C. C. A. 2d,
1919), the court reversed on finding
grounds for the motion. It is a
well settled rule that no one count
in an indictment may charge a person with more than one offense,
and if done the indictment is bad
for duplicity. 2 Moore (1932) Illinois Criminal Law and Procedure
812. It is also an elementary principle that an indictment must not
charge offenses in the alternative,
since the defendant cannot then
know precisely with what he is
charged or convicted so as to preclude a second prosecution for the
same offense. Tyompies Publishing Co. v. United States, 211 Fed.
385 (C. C. A. 6th, 1914). However,
it is not always easy to decide what
is "one offense" within the mean-
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ing of the rule concerning duplic- language through the use of such
ity. It would appear that where symbols." (See also the very rethe crime charged relates to one cent case of Albers v. Indemnity
act, or series of acts pertaining to Ins. Co., 283 Ill. App. 260 (1935).)
one transaction, it would not un- The use of these symbols has been
der the rule be duplicitous for condemned by the courts of sevmentioning the several acts, things eral states: by Alabama in Cla.j
or persons connected therewith. County Abstract Co. v. McKay, 226
For example, a count charging the Ala. 394, 147 So. 407 (1933); by
theft of a horse at one time and the Louisiana in State v. Dudley, 159
buggy at another has been held La. 872, 106 So. 364 (1925); by Utah
bad for duplicity. But a count in Putnam v. Industrial Commischarging theft of a horse and buggy sion, 80 Utah 187, 14 P. (2d) 973
at the same time is not duplicitous. (1932); by Nevada in Ex Parte
People v. Waters, 104 Ill. 544 Iratacable, 55 Nev. 263, 30 Pac.
(1882). On the other hand, if al- (2d) 284 (1934); by the Federal
ternate forms of words describe courts in Irving Trust Co. v. Rose,
offenses whose ingredients are not 67 Fed. (2d) 89 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933),
the same, and more than one of- and by the American Bar Associafense is used, the indictment must tion in its Journal of July, August,
be amended or the conviction September, and October, 1932. The
quashed, and that whether the link reason for this condemnation is
between the formulae be "or" or rather well stated in an Oregon
"and." Neither uncertainty nor case, Kronbrodt v. Equitable Trust
duplicity is removed by the use of Co., 137 Ore. 368, 2 P. (2d) 236,
"and" if more than one offense is
3 P. (2d) 127 (1931), wherein the
charged. 75 Sol. J. 788. Hence the court said: "The words 'and' and
determining question, and the one 'or' are not interchangeable terms,
on which the principal case turns, nor are they convertable. It often
is one of "certainty."
happens to preserve the sense it is
In holding that the primary necessary to construe 'and' as 'or'
requisite of criminal pleading is and 'or' as 'and,' but this is done
definiteness and certainty, so that only when it is necessary to do so
nothing is left to inference or in- in order to carry out an obvious
tendment, the court places great intent as shown by the context and
weight on the case of Tarjan v. to avoid an absurdity. They never
National Surety Co., 268 IM. App. mean the same thing." It is also
232 (1932), a non-criminal case, held that "and" and "or" when
and in doing so has garnered the combined ought never be used in
support of a court that has vigor- a pleading. Macurdav. Lewistown
ously opposed the use of such sym- Journal Co., 104 Me. 554, 72 Atl.
bols as "and/or" and "was/were." 490 (1908); STEvENS, PLEADINa (3d
The Illinois appellate court in an Am. Ed. 1882) 340.
opinion subsequent to the one cited
Though the decisions have been
in the principal case (City Na- strong in their condemnation of
tional Bank and Trust Co. v. Davis the use of the symbols, apparently
Hotel Corp., 280 IM. App. 247 but one case of those cited, the
(1935)), cites at length the cases Putnam case, supra, was reversed
in which they have condemned only because the use of the symbol
what they call "the pollution of our rendered the offense uncertain. All
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the rest have expressed their objections merely by obiter dicta
while passing to decide the case on
its merits, or have reversed where
there was also another ground on
which to do so.
The indictment in the principal
case was apparently framed under
Section 625 of the Texas Criminal
Statutes, entitled "Keeping." The
statute reads, '"fany person shall
keep or be in any manner interested in keeping any premises,
building, room or place for the
purpose of being used- as a place
to bet or wager, or to gamble with
cards, dice or dominoes, or to
keep -

etc."

Since

the

crime

charged is for keeping a place to
gamble one may well inquire: Did
the use of the symbol in the indictment or the omission of the
word "with" cause uncertainty as
to what crime was charged? It
seems not-and under the rules of
surplusage, the indictment if not
otherwise vitiated is good regardless of the surplus part (Bailey v.
United States, 269 U. S. 551
(1925)), which may be stricken.
People v. Osborne, 278 Ill. 104, 147
N. R 124 (1925). The instant decision may perhaps be sustained as
a valiant defense of the proper
usage of the English language, but
it is open to serious question
whether a grammatical impropriety, however egregious, should
alone be the basis of a reversal.
Though the court was -uncertain
whether or not the place was used
for betting at one or the other
games mentioned in the indictment, a sounder result would have
been reached by poising the case
for judgment on the issue of duplicity-does the indictment use a
form of words which discloses
more than one offense-or by following the federal rule, which

holds an indictment sufficient if it
states the essential elements of an
offense with such reasonable particularity as will advise the deiendant with reasonable certainty of
the nature of the accusation, and
thus enable him to prepare his defense. United States v. Goldman,
220 Fed. 57 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915);
see also, United States v. Aviles,
222 Fed. 474 .(D. C. Cal. 1915);
People v. Eflis, 185 Ill. App. 417,
420 (1914); Simpson v. United
States, 289 Fed. 188 (C. C. A. 9th,
1923), cert. denied, 263 U. S. 707
(1923). Since the crime charged is
for "keeping" a gambling house,
it would seem that confusion as to
exactly what forms of gambling
were therein carried out would be
no ground upon which to raise the
objection if it is clear that any one
game included under the statute is
sufficiently set forth so as to verify that the house was "kept" for
gambling purposes.
ROBERT R. NEAL.

CoNSTrTUTIoNAL LAW-DIVESTING
PRMSON-MADE GOODS OF THEIR INTERSTATE

CHARAcTER -

ORIGINAL

PACKAGE DocTint_-[Federal] The

defendant was convicted under an
Ohio statute (Oro GEN. CODE
(1933) §2228-1) prohibiting the resale of prison-made goods on the
open market. On appeal, affirmed.
Held: The Hawes-Cooper Act (45
STAT. 1084 (1929), 49 U. S. C. A.
§60 (1935)), providing that "All
goods . . . produced by convicts

.. transported into any State
. . . shall upon arrival and delivery... be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such
States . . . and shall not be ex-

empt therefrom by reason of being
introduced in the original package
or otherwise," divests prison-made
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goods of their interstate character
and removes constitutional restrictions on the power of a state to
regulate the resale of such interstate shipments though still in the
original package. Whitfield v. Ohio,
56 S. Ct. 532 (1936).
The federal power to prohibit the
shipment of goods in interstate
commerce has been held to be validly exercised only when the subject matter is "illicit," such as
adulterated drugs and foods (Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220
U. S. 45 (1911)), liquor (Clark
Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry.
Co., 242 U. S. 311 (1917)), white
slaves (Hoke v. United States, 227
U. S. 308 (1913)), and lottery
tickets (Champion v. Ames, 188 U.
S. 321 (1903)), or where a misuse
of interstate commerce will result
in the spread of harm from the
state of origin to people of other
states. Brooks v. United States,
267 U. S. 432 (1925). On the other
hand, goods made by child labor,
which in themselves are harmless,
may not be prohibited from interstate commerce, since their manufacture, not being commerce, is beyond the control of Congress. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251
(1918). The term "illicit" being
relative, there is room to criticize
the narrow definition given it by
the Court, since in the case of admittedly "illicit" goods, Congress
attempted, as also in the Child
Labor Law, to destroy the source
of production as well as to prevent
any harmful effect in other states
from the goods themselves. The
result has been to allow goods
manufactured under socially undesirable conditions to circulate in
interstate commerce free from federal restraint, and to be sold within a state, immune from local
regulation because goods still in
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the original package were considered to be in the flow of interstate commerce and did not become part of the general stock of
goods within the state until after
the original package was broken
or one resale had occurred. Leisy
v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100 (1889).
See Snider, Growth of State Power
vnder Federal Constitution to
Regulate Traffic in Intoxicating
Liquors (1918) 25 W. Va. L. Q. 42.
The Hawes-Cooper Act, rather
than prohibiting interstate shipments, merely removes whatever
immunity an original package
heretofore gave to interstate goods,
and permits state regulation to attach effectively. See Dowling and
Hubbard, Divesting an. Article of
Its Interstate Character (1921) 5
Minn. L. Rev. 100. Heretofore, such
technique has been applied only
to liquor (In re Rahrer, 140 U. S.
545 (1891), which upheld the Wilson Act, 25 STAT. 313 (1890), 27
U. S. C. A. §121 (1935)), the interstate shipment of which Congress
might well have prohibited since it
was "illicit" (Clark Distilling Co. v.
Western Md. Ry. Co., supra), so
that till now the question was undecided as to whether Congress
could apply this technique to nondeleterious goods, such as those
made by prison labor, without exceeding its powers. The way now
seems open for similar federal statutes relating to things other than
prison-made goods. See Chambliss, Constitutional Code Control
(1936) 30 IlM. L. Rev. 829; Black,
The Significance of the Divesting
Theory in the Regulation of Milk
(1935) 23 Ky. L. J. 589. For example, Congress, by enacting a law
subjecting goods made by child
labor to state laws might thus induce states to pass complementary
laws relating thereto, though the
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desirability of using such a legal
method in lieu of the long considered child labor amendment is
debatable.
This decision will, in all probability, result in a further contraction of prison manufacturing, with
increased problems of prison administration because of convict
idleness, since it paves the way for
other state statutes prohibiting the
resale of such goods. Under appropriate statutes in pursuance of
the later Ashurst-Sumners Act, 49
STAT. 494, 49 U. S. C. A. §61 (1935),
prohibiting the interstate shipment
of goods in contravention of local
law, states could also prohibit the
entry of prison-made goods. With
a consequent narrowing of the
market, the ultimate effect will
probably be to limit production to
the state-use system. See Note
(1936) 26 J. Crim. L. 764.
MARVIn M. FnM.
GmqR
ASSIGNED EHOR AN
ExcEprox.-[Florida] Defendants
were convicted of larceny of three
cows. Upon appeal defendants assigned as error the charge given
by the trial court, to which only
general exception had been taken
below. Held: that objection cannot be considered by the Supreme
Court unless the subject matter of
the objection has been properly
excepted to at the trial. And the
rule applies even when the error,
as here, consists of an obviously
incorrect charge as to the law of
the ease. Ward v. State. 166 So.
563 (Fla. 1936).
The erroneous charge, which the
trial court gave of its own motion,
was as follows: "The law is that
where one is found in the possession of such property, it is prima
facie evidence of his guilt of the

285
larceny of that property." The
statement is obviously incorrect:
it denies the presumption of innocence (see Linden et al. v. United
States (C. C. A. 3rd, 1924), 296
Fed. 104), the rule as to burden of
proof, and in the event that the
defendants did not take the stand
is a judicial comment on that fact.
Nevertheless, the affirmance of the
judgment was based upon a wellestablished rule, that objection will
not be heard unless the ruling of
the trial court has been the ground
of a specific exception, advising the
trial court of the objection so that
it had an opportunity to modify or
revise if such action should be
deemed necessary. (Cases so holding are collected in 16 C. J. §2647
and in the Current Digests for the
last ten years under the heading
of "Criminal Law," §1056-1 and
§1064-7. The cases are numerous
and are from almost all jurisdicThe general rule, with
tions.)
several exceptions or reservations
to be mentioned later, is well expressed in a recent Illinois case:
"The defendant is in no position to
urge that the giving of the instruction was erroneous, as an examination of the record fails to disclose
any objection made or an exception
taken to the giving of the instruction." People v. Reeves, 360 M]1. 55,
195 N. E. 443 (1935). See also
People v. Peck, 358 Ill. 642, 193 N.
E. 609 (1934). Similarly, a specific refusal to charge must be excepted to and assigned as error.
White v. State, 121 Fla. 128, 163 So.
403 (1935); Jindra v. United States,
69 F. (2d) 429 (1934).
The exceptions to the general
rule are: the Texas rule that appeal will be allowed for "fundamental error" in the court's instructions even though no proper
exception was taken, Clayton v.

286

RECENT CRIMINAL CASES

State, 78 Tex. Cr. 78, 180 S. W. it is no surprise to find Florida
1089 (1915); Holmes v. State, 70 cases which do not agree with the
Tex. Cr. 214, 156 S. W. 1172 (1913);
principal case. In 1923 indictments
and the New Brunswick rule al- for murder were brought agaiust
lowing appeal for misdirection on
three related defendants, and coi,a material point, although proper
victions were had for lesser ofexception be lacking. In Rex. v.
Daley, 39 N. B. 411, at 416, the fenses. Apparently basing its accourt said: "I know of no rule tion on a belief that the convicwhich deprives a person who is tions were unreasonable or unjust,
convicted under a misdirection of the Supreme Court of Florida rethe trial judge of his right to a new versed without paying more than
trial merely because he did not cursory attention to the fact that
complain of the misdirection at the the defendants had not properly
time." Some few States have proexcepted to the charge of the trial
visions in their statutes that appeal
court, as to which error was
is to be allowed in the absence of claimed in the appeal. Ellis v.
proper exception, but this proState, 86 Fla. 165, 97 So. 285, 86
vision is usually limited to major Fla. 257, 97 So. 520. But, instead
convictions. New York State has of being an occasional exception
such a statutory provision. (Code
to the general practice, appeal
of Criminal Procedure, Gilbert, should always be permitted-re§527-528.)
gardless of technical rules-where
Some courts, however, will not the trial court has misdirected the
affirm a judgment merely because jury as to the law of the case.
the proper exception was not taken Judicial incompetency should not
at the proper time if they are con- be excused, or checkmated, by the
vinced that justice demands a re- incompetency of defendant's counversal.
In this regard judicial sel. The defendant is likely enough
reasoning becomes extremely practo suffer from both and, in the intical and rules of procedure are terests of justice-that he shall not
no obstacle to an end which is suffer too much-the appellate
decided upon before the applicacourts should not leave him helption of the rules is worked out. less.
23 J. Crim. L. 28. Consequently,
JAMxS C. HALLAHAN.

